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Abstract
A central issue in applying auction theory in practice is the problem of dealing with budget-
constrained agents. A desirable goal in practice is to design incentive compatible, individually
rational, and Pareto optimal auctions while respecting the budget constraints. Achieving this
goal is particularly challenging in the presence of nontrivial combinatorial constraints over the
set of feasible allocations.
Toward this goal and motivated by AdWords auctions, we present an auction for polyma-
troidal environments satisfying the above properties. Our auction employs a novel clinching
technique with a clean geometric description and only needs an oracle access to the submodular
function defining the polymatroid. As a result, this auction not only simplifies and generalizes all
previous results, it applies to several new applications including AdWords Auctions, bandwidth
markets, and video on demand. In particular, our characterization of the AdWords auction as
polymatroidal constraints might be of independent interest. This allows us to design the first
mechanism for Ad Auctions taking into account simultaneously budgets, multiple keywords and
multiple slots.
We show that it is impossible to extend this result to generic polyhedral constraints. This
also implies an impossibility result for multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal utilities in
the presence of budget constraints.
∗This author’s contribution to this work was made while he was an intern at Google Inc. He is currently a graduate
student at Cornell University supported by a Microsoft Fellowship.
1 Introduction
A large part of auction theory deals with the problem of designing truthful mechanisms for quasi-
linear settings. For these settings, the VCG mechanism, or variants of it like affine-maximizers, can
be applied to get optimal or near-optimal auctions. However, when we deviate from the quasi-linear
model, very little is known. One of the most natural and practically important feature missing from
the quasi-linear model is the presence of budget constraints. Budgets play a major role in several
real-world auctions where the magnitude of the transactions involved naturally put a financial
constraint on the bidders. Examples of such auctions include those used for the privatization of
public assets in eastern Europe, or those for the distribution of radio spectra in the US (for a
discussion on this, see Benoit and Krishna [6]). Another important example is that of Ad Auctions
where advertisers explicitly declare budget constraints. In such settings, respecting the declared
budget constraints is a necessary property any mechanism must satisfy. There is much discussion
on the source of budget constraints (we refer to Che and Gale [11] for a detailed discussion on this
topic).
Satisfying budget constraints while keeping incentive compatibility and efficiency is a challeng-
ing problem, and it becomes even harder in the presence of complex combinatorial constraints over
the set of feasible allocations. In the presence of budgets, individual rationality and truthfulness
cannot be satisfied at the same time as maximizing social welfare [14], and thus the goal of maxi-
mizing efficiency can be achieved mainly through Pareto-optimal auctions 1. Therefore, a desirable
goal under budget constraints is to design incentive-compatible (IC) and individually-rational (IR)
auctions while producing Pareto-optimal outcomes. The first successful example of such mecha-
nisms was developed in the seminal paper of Dobzinski, Lavi and Nisan [14], where the authors
adapt the clinching auction framework of Ausubel [5] to give a truthful mechanism that achieves
Pareto-optimality. Their setting, however, captures only a simple allocation constraint: there is a
limited supply of k items and each player has a value of vi for each item (and hence value of vi · t
for getting t items) and budget Bi.
As for more general allocation constraints, there have been a couple of subsequent work cap-
turing special families of allocation constraints, e.g., unit demands [2], or multi-unit demands with
matching constraints [18]. Although these results are mainly based on Ausubel’s clinching auction,
each of them need to develop independent techniques to deal with their specific environment - for
example, Fiat, Leonardi, Saia, and Sankowski [18] define a complex clinching procedure based on
trading paths in a bipartite graph and computing S-avoid matchings. Our goal in this paper is
to extend these results to a much more general class of polyhedral constraints. In particular, we
would like to understand for what polyhedral environments one can design such auctions, and also
identify simple environments for which designing such auctions is not possible.
Our Results and Techniques. Firstly, inspired by an application in Sponsored Search Ad
Auctions and several other applications, we study polymatroid constraints over feasible allocations
and give an auction that achieves all the desired properties, i.e., it satisfies IC, IR, and produces
Pareto-optimal outcomes while satisfying the budget constraints. We assume that the budgets
are public - which was shown in [14] to be a necessary assumption2. While following Ausubel’s
framework to design this auction, we need to invent the main component of the mechanism, i.e.,
1An auction is Pareto-optimal if it outputs an allocation and payments such that no alternative set of allocation
and payments improves the utility of at least one agent and keeps the other agents at least as happy as before. Here
agents include bidders and the auctioneer where the auctioneer’s utility is its revenue
2Dobzinski et. al. [14] showed that with private budgets, truthfulness and Pareto-optimality cannot be achieved
using deterministic mechanisms - not even for multi-unit auctions
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the clinching step that copes with the polyhedral allocation constraints. Our clinching step uses
submodular minimization as a subroutine and only needs a value oracle access to the submodular
function corresponding to the polymatroid. As a result, our mechanism has a clean geometric
description that abstracts away the combinatorial complications of previous designs. This leaves
the auctioneer free to focus on modeling the environment, and then use our mechanism as a black-
box. This general technique not only generalizes (and simplifies) the previously known results like
multi-unit auctions with matching constraints [14, 18], but also extend clinching auctions to many
other applications like the AdWords Auction and settings like spanning tree auctions and video on
demand [8]. Our main application is in sponsored search auctions where we model the AdWords
Auction with multiple keywords and multiple position slots per keyword as a polymatroid called
the AdWords polytope (See Section 4.1 for details).
In order to extend this result to more general polyhedral constraints, we turn our attention to
2-player auctions with budget constraints and prove several structural properties of Pareto-optimal
truthful auctions for polyhedral environments In particular, we present a characterization of such
auctions that results in various impossibility results and one positive result. On the positive side,
we present a truthful individually rational Pareto-optimal auction for any environment if only one
player is budget-constrained. On the other hand, if more than one player is budget-constrained,
we illustrate simple polytope constraints for which it is impossible to achieve a truthful Pareto-
optimal auction even for two players. Moreover, as a byproduct of this characterization, we get
an impossibility result for multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal utilities. This impossibility
result disproves an implied conjecture by Ausubel [5] which has been reinforced by follow-up papers
[14, 21]. In fact, this conjecture was reinforced by the fact that getting such an auction is possible
whenever the marginals are flat. In appendix D we provide an explicit counter-example for this case.
Applications to Sponsored Search. Online advertisement is a growing business that was
worth 25 billion dollars in 2010. It also has become a central piece in the current internet landscape,
since it is the primary way internet companies monetize their services. Large part of this revenue
comes from the search advertisement, hence it is not surprising that is has been extensively studied
in the literature. The basic model of sponsored search ad auctions was proposed simultaneously
by Edelman, Ostrovky and Schwarz [16] and Varian [31]. The authors model the current auction
as a non-truthful mechanism and analyze its equilibrium properties. The social welfare of such
equilibria were studied in [28, 22, 10] and its revenue properties in [23].
In search advertising, there are usually multiple keywords and each keyword has multiple slots
associated with it. Most of the previous work treat auctions for different keywords as being indepen-
dent, and therefore focus on a single keyword. A recent paper by Dhangwatnotai [13] approaches
the problem of analyzing keyword auctions for multiple keywords, but it is restricted to a special
case of one slot per page. Similarly, the work of Fiat et al [18] can be seen as an auction for multiple
keywords with only one slot per page.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first work to combine multiple slots per page and
multiple keywords. We do so by giving a non-trivial characterization of the set of all feasible allo-
cations of clicks: we call it the AdWords Polytope. We show it has the structure of a polymatroid
and therefore we can use our result to generate a truthful Pareto-optimal auction for this setting.
Other Related Work. There are two streams of related work. The first, like ours, is on design-
ing truthful mechanisms when players have budget constraints with the goal of achieving Pareto-
optimal outcomes; for example, [14], and [18]. Bhattacharya et al [7] show a budget-monotonicity
property for the clinching auction of [14], therefore arguing that no player can improve his utility by
under-reporting his budget. For the case of unit-demand players, Aggrawal et al [2] design auctions
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for unit-demand players with budget constraints.
On the question of maximizing revenue, Borgs et al [9] gave a truthful auction whose revenue
is asymptotically within a constant factor of the optimal revenue. These results were improved by
Abrams [1]. Subsequently, Hafalir, Ravi and Sayedi [20] relax the truthfulness requirement, moving
to ex-post Nash equilibrium as a solution concept, and give an auction that, in equilibrium, has
good efficiency and revenue properties. More recently, Pai and Vohra [29] gave a revenue-optimal
auction for the Bayesian version of the problem. We would like to highlight that the above work
focused on the multi-unit setting only.
Our auction also generalizes the ascending auction of Bikhchandani et al [8]. The authors
consider environments where the set of allocations is defined by a polymatroid, but don’t consider
budget constraints.
The second line of related work relates to the practical problem of designing mechanisms for Ad
Auctions. The work of Feldman et al [17] design an auction for the environment with one keyword
and multiple slots. Their model is, however, different from the standard utilitarian utility model.
Instead of being profit maximizers, the players are clicks maximizers, i.e., the players want to get
as many clicks as possible without exhausting their budget and without paying more per click than
their value, which is a simpler setting than ours. In order to design their auction, they describe
the structure of the set of possible randomized allocations of players to slots. We note that the
structure they identify is in fact a polymatroid and use this fact to apply our auction to this setting.
We further extend this characterization to the setting with multiple keywords.
Also for one keyword and multiple slots, Ashlagi et al [4] design an auction for the usual utility
model but relax the truthfulness requirement and get an auction that is Pareto-optimal for all
ex-post Nash equilibria. The main weakness in the setting of [4] is that the agents are allowed to
be allocated only to one slot position for all the different queries of the given keyword. However, in
reality, agents can be allocated to different slot positions for different queries of a given keyword.
In the restricted setting of [4], the Pareto-optimality requirement becomes easier to satisfy.
Independently of our work, Colini-Baldeschi et al [12] also study the problem of designing incen-
tive compatible, individually rational, budget feasible and Pareto-optimal auctions for sponsored
search. The authors present two auctions satisfying those properties: one for the case with a single
keyword but multiple slots with different click-through-rates and one for the case of multiple key-
words and multiple slots with homogeneous click-through-rates (i.e. all slots are identical).
Impossibility results. The impossibility of a Pareto-optimal auction for heterogeneous goods
in the budgeted setting was given in [18]. It remained an open problem whether an auction was
possible if goods where identical, i.e., utilities depended only on the number items acquired and not
on which items they were. A very recent result by Lavi and May [21] shows an impossibility result
for the case where the valuation can be an arbitrary function of the number of items - i.e. players
are allowed to express complementarities. Since their setting is more expressive, an impossibility
result is easier. Our impossibility result for multi-unit auctions can be seen as a stronger version
of their result, since we allow players only to express valuations with diminishing marginals. This
came as a surprise to us, since it was generally believed that such a positive result could be achieved
using a variation of [14].
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2 Auctions for Polyhedral Environments
Consider n players, where player i has a positive value vi per unit of some good g and a budget
of Bi. We assume that the valuations are private information of the players, whereas the budgets
are public. We are also given a subset X ⊆ Rn+ that defines all the possible ways to allocate the
good g. We assume that the subset X is a convex set that is bounded and downward closed3. We
will call this set X an environment. Note that if player i receives xi amount of good g and pays
pi, her utility ui is equal to vixi − pi if pi ≤ Bi and −∞ otherwise. However, since we will require
the mechanism to never charge more than the budgets, we won’t have to deal with the latter case.
Our goal is to design an auction mechanism that elicits valuations v from the players and outputs
a feasible allocation x(v) ∈ X and a feasible payment vector p(v) ≤ B that satisfies the following
three properties:
• Individual Rationality (a.k.a. voluntary participation): Each player has net non-negative
utility from participating in the auction, i.e., ui ≥ 0.
• Incentive compatibility (a.k.a. truthfulness) : It is a dominant strategy for each player
to participate in the auction and report their true value, i.e., vixi(vi, v−i) − pi(vi, v−i) ≥
vixi(v
′
i, v−i) − pi(v
′
i, v−i). The characterization of single-parameter truthful mechanisms in
[25, 3] states that this is equivalent to xi being a non-decreasing function of vi (for a fixed
v−i) and payments being calculated by pi(vi, v−i) = vixi(vi, v−i)−
∫ vi
0 xi(u, v−i)du.
• Pareto-optimality: An allocation x(v) ∈ X and payments p(v) ≤ B is Pareto-optimal if and
only if there is no alternative allocation and payments where all players’ utilities and the
revenue of the auctioneer do not decrease, and at least one of them increases. In other words,
there is no alternative (x′, p′) such that vix
′
i − p
′
i ≥ vixi(v) − pi(v),
∑
i p
′
i ≥
∑
i pi(v) and at
least one of those inequalities is strict.
Next we prove a useful lemma about the structure of Pareto-optimal outcomes.
Lemma 2.1 A feasible outcome (x, p), i.e. x ∈ X and p ≤ B, is Pareto-optimal iff there is no
d ∈ Rn in a dominated direction at x (i.e. x+ d ∈ X0 := {x′ ∈ X;∃xˆ ∈ X \ x′, xˆ ≥ x′}) such that
dtv ≥ 0 and di ≤ 0 for all i that have pi = Bi.
Proof : In order to show the ⇒ direction, assume there is a dominated direction d such that
dtv ≥ 0 and di ≤ 0 for all i that have pi = Bi. Then define x
′
i = xi + di and p
′
i = pi + vidi and we
obtain same utilities and the total payment didn’t decrease, since
∑
i p
′
i −
∑
i pi = d
tv ≥ 0. Now,
since x+d is not in the boundary of the polytope, we can give some more of good g to some players
without charging extra payments and increase their utility. Therefore (x, p) is not Pareto-optimal.
For the⇐ direction, suppose (x′, p′) is a Pareto improvement. Define d = x′−x. First we claim
that dtv > 0. By the definition of Pareto optimality, vixi − pi ≤ vix
′
i − p
′
i,
∑
i pi ≤
∑
i p
′
i and at
least one inequality is strict. Summing them all, we get that
∑
i vixi <
∑
i vix
′
i, which implies that
dtv > 0. Now, consider two cases:
If x′i ≤ xi for all i with pi = Bi, then di ≤ 0 for all such i. Simply pick some i for which di > 0
and decrease di slightly. The result will be a dominated direction d
′ (since x + d′ ≤ x + d and
x+ d′ 6= x+ d) with d′tv > 0 and d′i ≤ 0 for all i with pi = Bi.
If x′i > xi for some i with pi = Bi. Then define d
′ such that d′i = di if pi < Bi and d
′
i = min{0, di}
if pi = Bi. Now, consider x
′′ = x + d′ and p′′ = p′. Clearly d′ is a dominated direction (since
3This is without loss of genearality if one is allowed to randomize between outcomes, and can allocate lesser amount
of the good g to any player.
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x + d′ ≤ x + d and x + d′ 6= x + d) and d′i ≤ 0 for pi = Bi by definition. Now, we will show that
d′tv ≥ 0. Notice that
∑
i p
′′
i =
∑
i p
′
i ≥
∑
i pi. Also, except for i with x
′
i > xi and pi = Bi we have:
vix
′′
i − p
′′
i = vix
′
i − p
′
i ≥ vixi − pi. For theremaining i, one has: vix
′′
i − p
′′
i = vixi − p
′
i ≥ vixi − pi.
Summing all those inequalities, we get
∑
i vix
′′
i ≥
∑
i vixi, implying that d
′tv ≥ 0.
Another simple observation is that if (x, p) is a Pareto-optimal outcome in which no budget
is fully exhausted, then x = argmaxx∈Xv
tx. For small valuations, any Pareto-optimal mechanism
that satisfies individually rationality cannot exhaust budgets, so it must behave like VCG.
2.1 Polymatroidal environments
Our most interesting applications correspond to settings where the environment is a packing poly-
tope P = {x ∈ Rn+;Ax ≤ b} for some m × n matrix with Aij ≥ 0 and b ∈ R
m
+ . We call such
environments a polyhedral environment. Examples of polyhedral environments are ubiquitous in
game theory (see [26, 27] for many examples).
A rich subclass of packing polytopes is the class of polymatroids, which are polytopes that can
be written as P = {x ∈ Rn+;
∑
i∈S xi ≤ f(S)} where f : 2
[n] → R+ is a monotone submodular
function, i.e., a function satisfying:
f(S ∪ T ) + f(S ∩ T ) ≤ f(S) + f(T ),∀S, T ⊆ [n]
f(S) ≤ f(T ),∀S ⊆ T ⊆ [n]
Such polymatroidal environments generalize matroid environments. It is easy to see that all previ-
ously studied settings are instances of a these environments: Dobzinski et al’s result [14] corresponds
to the uniform matroid and Fiat et al’s result [18] corresponds to the transversal matroid. Bikhchan-
dani et al [8] give many examples of polymatroid environments including scheduling with due dates,
network planning, pairwise kidney exchange, spatial markets, bandwidth markets and multi-class
queueing systems [8]. In section 4 we discuss some of those applications in more depth and present
a novel application of polymatroids to sponsored search auctions.
3 Clinching Auction for Polymatroids
In this section, we describe our main positive result, i.e., an auction with all the desirable properties
for polymatroidal environments. This auction is based on the clinching auctions framework of
Ausubel [5]. Before we study more complicated constraints, let’s recall the clinching auction
[5, 14] for the multi-unit setting, i.e., P = {x;
∑
i xi ≤ s0}. We begin by setting the supply s = s0
and Bi the budget available to each agent. We maintain a price clock p that begins at zero and
gradually ascends. For each price p, the agents are asked how much of the good they demand at
the current price. Their demand will be di =
Bi
p (how much they can afford with their remaining
budget) if p ≤ vi, and zero otherwise (the case where the price exceeds their marginal value). Then
agent i is able to clinch an amount δi = [s−
∑
j 6=i dj ]
+, which is the minimum amount we can give
to player i while we are still able to meet the aggregate demands of the other players. Clinching
means that player i gets δi amounts of the good, and δip is subtracted from his budget. The price
increases and we repeat the process until the supply is completely sold.
The heart of the mechanism is the clinching step and generalizing it for more complicated en-
vironments involves various challenges: how does one define the notion of supply and aggregate
demand (it is not a single number anymore, since there are constraints restraining the possible
allocation)? Finally, we need to make sure the clinching step doesn’t violate feasibility.
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Clinching Framework. First, in Algorithm 1, we consider a slightly modified version of the
clinching framework: we maintain a price vector p ∈ Rn+ and increase the prices one player at a
time. The vector ρ ∈ Rn+ contains the promised allocations in each step and its final value is the
final allocation of the mechanism. The payment of each agent is the total amount that was deducted
from their budget during the execution 4.
Algorithm 1 Polyhedral Clinching Auction
Input: P, vi, Bi
pi = 0, ρi = 0, iˆ = 1
do
di = Bi/pi if pi < vi and di = 0 otherwise,
δ = clinch(P, ρ, d),
ρi = ρi + δi, Bi = Bi − piδi,
di = Bi/pi if pi < vi and di = 0 otherwise,
piˆ = piˆ + ǫ , iˆ = iˆ+ 1 mod n
while d 6= 0
For each price, we calculate the demand di of each player, which is the amount of the good
they would like to get for price p. Then we invoke a procedure called clinch which decides the
amount to grant to each player at that price. We update the promises, remaining budget and adjust
demands5. Then we increase the price.
In order to define clinching, we need to define analogues of the remnant supply and to demands
for the case where the the environment is a generic polytope. Instead of being a single number as
in the multi-unit auctions case, the remnant supply and aggregate demands will be polytopes:
Definition 3.1 (aggregate demands) Given P , a vector of promised allocation ρ ∈ P , the rem-
nant supply is described by the polytope Pρ = {x ≥ 0; ρ+ x ∈ P}. If d ∈ R
n
+ is the demand vector,
the aggregate demand is defined by Pρ,d = {x ≥ 0; ρ+ x ∈ P, x ≤ d}.
In the multi-unit auctions case, the amount player i clinched was the maximum amount we
could give him while still being able to meet the demands of the other players. We generalize this
notion to polyhedral environments (the concepts are depicted in Figure 1):
Definition 3.2 (polyhedral clinching) The demand set of players [n] \ i if one allocates xi to
player i is represented by the polytope P iρ,d(xi) = {x−i ∈ R
[n]\i
+ ; (xi, x−i) ∈ Pρ,d}. Since P is a
packing polytope, clearly P iρ,d(xi) ⊇ P
i
ρ,d(x
′
i) if xi ≤ x
′
i. The amount player i is able to clinch is the
maximum amount we can give him without making any allocation for the other players infeasible.
More formally, δi = sup{xi ≥ 0;P
i
ρ,d(xi) = P
i
ρ,d(0)}.
We need to ensure that the clinching step is well-defined, i.e., that after clinching is performed,
the vector of promised allocations is still feasible. This is done by the following lemma:
Lemma 3.3 For each step of the auction above, if ρ ∈ P , then ρ+ δ ∈ P .
Proof : Let χi be the i-th coordinate vector. Note that δ1χ
1 ∈ Pρ,d by definition of δ. Now,
notice that δ1χ
1 ∈ P 2ρ,d(0) = P
2
ρ,d(δ2), so: δ
1χ1 + δ2χ
2 ∈ Pρ,d. By induction, we can show that
4Note that the details of the main procedure clinch is not described in this algorithm.
5Clearly updating demands is not necessary at this point, but we do in order to make the analysis cleaner.
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ρρ+ d
Pρ,d
P 1ρ,d(0) P
1
ρ,d(δ1)
P 1ρ,d(δ1 + ǫ)
ρ
ρ+ d
Figure 1: Illustration of polyhedral clinching: the first two figures depict the polytopes defined
in Definitions 3.1 and 3.2. The third depicts the mechanism running on polytope P : during the
execution, the vector ρ walks inside the polytope (blue line) and the vector ρ + d walks outside it
(red line), until they meet at the boundary. The point they meet corresponds to the final allocation.
∑j
i=1 δiχ
i ∈ Pρ,d. The induction is easy:
∑j
i=1 δiχ
i ∈ P j+1ρ,d (0) = P
j+1
ρ,d (δj+1), so
∑j+1
i=1 δiχ
i ∈ P j+1ρ,d .
This auction is clearly truthful, since each player i reports only vi, and she can stop her partic-
ipation earlier (which she doesn’t want, since she will potentially miss items she are interested in)
or later (which will potentially give her items for a price higher than her valuation). It is also indi-
vidually rational, since players only get items for prices below their valuation and respect budgets
by the definition. Notice that those facts are true regardless of the trajectory of the price vector:
any process that increases prices (in a potentially non-uniform way) has this property.
Lemma 3.4 The auction in Algorithm 1 along with the clinching step described in Definition 3.2
is truthful, individually-rational and budget-feasible.
Clinching for polymatroids. Notice that we haven’t used anything from polymatroids yet,
so Lemma 3.4 holds for any polytope P . However, two things are left to be shown: (i) that amount
clinched can be computed efficiently and (ii) that the outcome is Pareto optimal. To show both of
these properties, we use the fact that P is a polymatroid.
Lemma 3.5 If the environment is a polymatroid P defined by a submodular function f , then the
amount player i clinches in Algorithm 1 is given by:
δi = (maxx∈Pρ,d 1
tx)− (maxx∈Pρ,d 1
t
−ix−i).
Moreover, this can be calculated efficiently using submodular minimization.
The main ingredients of the proof are the following two facts about polymatroids:
Fact 3.6 (Schrijver [30], sections 44.1 and 44.4) If P is a polymatroid defined by the submod-
ular function f , then Pρ,d is also a polymatroid defined by the following submodular function:
fˆ(S) = min
T⊆S
{f(T )− ρ(T ) + d(S \ T )}.
Notice that fˆ(·) might not be monotone. However,
f¯(S) = min
S′⊇S
fˆ(S′)
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is a monotone submodular function that defines the same polymatroid.
Fact 3.7 Given two monotone submodular functions f, f˜ , then the polymatroids P, P˜ defined by
them are equal iff the functions are equal. The (⇐) direction is trivial. For the other direction,
notice that if f(S) < f˜(S) say for S = {1, . . . , i}, notice that the point x such that xj = f˜({1..j})−
f˜({1..j − 1}) for j ≤ i and zero otherwise is such that x ∈ P˜ \ P .
Proof of Lemma 3.5 : Using the fact 3.6, we know that P iρ,d(xi) is also a polymatroid defined
over [n] \ i by the function f˜(S) = min{f¯(S), f¯ (S ∪ i) − xi}. Now, we use Fact 3.7 to see that
P iρ,d(xi) = P
i
ρ,d(0) iff f¯(S) ≤ f¯(S ∪ i)− xi,∀S ⊆ [n] \ i. So, δi = minS⊆[n]\i f¯(S ∪ i)− f¯(S). Since f¯
is submodular, the smallest marginal can only be
f¯([n])− f¯([n] \ i) = max{0, fˆ([n])− fˆ([n] \ i)}
which is exactly the expression in the statement of the lemma. Now, one can easily see that
evaluating fˆ is a submodular minimization problem.
Now we prove that the outcomes are Pareto-optimal in two steps. The first step is to characterize
Pareto-optimal allocations for polymatroids. This characterization is stronger than that of Lemma
2.1, since it explores the structure of polymatroids. Afterwards, we show that the outcomes of the
chinching auction defined in Algorithm 1 satisfy the two conditions in the characterization lemma.
In the following, for a vector x ∈ Rn and S ⊆ [n] we denote x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi.
Lemma 3.8 For a polymatroidal environment P defined by a submodular function f , an allocation
(x, p) is Pareto optimal iff:
1. All items are sold, i.e., x([n]) = f([n]), and
2. Given a player i with pi < Bi and player j with vj < vi, then there exists a set S such that
x(S) = f(S), i ∈ S and j /∈ S
The following elementary facts about submodular functions will be useful in the proof of the
Lemma 3.8:
Fact 3.9 Given a vector x ∈ P , if two sets S, T are tight (i.e. x(S) = f(S) and x(T ) = f(T )),
then S ∩ T and S ∪ T are also tight. The proof is quite elementary: x(S ∪ T ) = x(S) + x(T ) −
x(S ∩ T ) ≥ f(S) + f(T )− f(S ∩ T ) ≥ f(S ∪ T ). So, all the inequalities must be tight and therefore
x(S ∪ T ) = f(S ∪ T ) and x(S ∩ T ) = f(S ∩ T ).
Fact 3.10 If x([n]) < f([n]) then there is one component xi that we can increase by δ > 0 such
that x is still in P . It follows from the previous fact: if all players i were contained in a tight set,
one could take the union of those and [n] would be tight. Then there is some element i which is in
no tight set.
Proof of Lemma 3.8 : The (⇒) direction is easy. If x([n]) < f([n]) then we can increase some
xi (Fact 3.10) and still get point P generating a Pareto improvement. Also, if there is pi < Bi and
vj < vi and no tight set separating them, then we can consider another outcome where we increase
xi by some δ > 0, decrease xj by some δ < 0 and still get a feasible point improving x
tv. Now, this
would not be Pareto optimal by Lemma 2.1.
For the (⇐) direction, let (x, p) be an outcome satisfying properties 1 and 2 and suppose (x′, p′)
is a Pareto-improvement. This means that vix
′
i − p
′
i ≥ vixi − pi and
∑
i p
′
i ≥
∑
i pi.
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Let {i1, . . . , ik} = {n} ∪ {i; pi < Bi}, sorted in non-increasing order of vi. Using property 2
(notice it holds for player n trivially) together with fact 3.9, we define the following family of tight
sets S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Sk = [n], tight in the sense that x(Si) = f(Si). For all vt < vi1 there is a tight
set S1t that has i1 but not t. Let S1 be the intersection of such sets. Now, given S1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Sj−1, we
define Sj in the following way: If ij ∈ Sj−1, take Sj = Sj−1 (notice can only happen if vij = vij−1).
If not, for each vt < vij there is a tight set Sjt that has ij but not t. Now, define Sj as the union
of Sj−1 and the intersection of the Sjt sets.
By eliminating duplicates and its corresponding elements from {i1 . . . ik}, we get a family S1 ⊂
. . . ⊂ Sk. Define Tj = Sj \ Sj−1 and it is clear the family obtained has the following properties:
• all t ∈ Sj have vt ≥ vij
• ij ∈ Tj
• for all i ∈ Tj either vi = vij or pi = Bi.
Let T ′j = {i ∈ Tj ; vi 6= vij} and T
′′
j = {i ∈ Tj; vi = vij}. Since the players in T
′
j have exhausted their
budget, pi ≥ p
′
i. Using that and Pareto-optimality, we get:∑
i∈T ′j
pi − p
′
i ≥
≥
∑
i∈T ′j ,xi≥x
′
i
pi − p
′
i ≥
∑
i∈T ′j ,xi≥x
′
i
vi(xi − x
′
i)
∗
≥
≥
∑
i∈T ′j ,xi≥x
′
i
vij (xi − x
′
i)
∗∗
≥
∑
i∈T ′j
vij (xi − x
′
i)
(1)
Now, we can add the inequality pi − p
′
i ≥ vij (xi − x
′
i) for i ∈ T
′′
j and obtain:∑
i∈Tj
pi − p
′
i ≥
∑
i∈Tj
vij (xi − x
′
i) (2)
Summing those for all j and get:∑
i
pi − p
′
i ≥
∑
j
∑
i∈Tj
vij (xi − x
′
i) =
∑
j
(vij − vij+1)
∑
i∈Sj
(xi − x
′
i) ≥ 0
since x(Sj) = f(Sj) ≥ x
′(Sj). Therefore
∑
i pi ≥
∑
i p
′
i and therefore equal. This means in
particular all of the inequalities in (1) and (2) must be tight. Therefore for all i ∈ T ′j we need to
have xi = x
′
i, since if xi > x
′
i then inequality ∗ in (1) would be strict. If xi < x
′
i, then inequality
∗∗ would be strict. We use this fact to show that
∑
i∈Sj
vi(xi − x
′
i) ≥ 0 by induction on j. If we
show that, we can take j = k and then we are done, since this will imply that
∑
i vixi ≥
∑
i vix
′
i
and therefore (x′, p′) cannot be a Pareto-improvement.
For j = 1, this is trivial, since we can write:∑
i∈S1,vi 6=vi1
vi(xi − x
′
i) ≥
∑
i∈S1,vi 6=vi1
vi1(xi − x
′
i)
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since both terms are zero, and then sum vi(xi − x
′
i) for the rest of the elements in S1 and use the
fact that S1 is tight. For other j, we use that:∑
i∈Sj
vi(xi − x
′
i) ≥
≥ vij−1
∑
i∈Sj−1
(xi − x
′
i) +
∑
i∈T ′j
vi(xi − x
′
i) +
∑
i∈T ′′j
vij (xi − x
′
i) ≥
≥ vij
∑
i∈Sj
(xi − x
′
i) = vij (x(Sj)− x
′(Sj)) ≥ 0,
by the fact that Sj is tight.
Now, we argue that, for sufficiently small ǫ, the outcome satisfied the two properties in Lemma
3.8 and hence is Pareto-optimal. We prove this fact using the following sequence of lemmas:
Lemma 3.11 After the clinching step is executed, and before updating prices, fˆ([n]) ≤ fˆ([n] \
j),∀j ∈ [n].
Proof : In the clinching step, given an initial fˆ0, we define δi = max{0, fˆ0([n])− fˆ0([n]\ i)}. After
we update ρ,B, d, fˆ is updated to fˆ1(S) = fˆ0(S)− δ(S). Now, it is easy to check that:
fˆ1([n]) = fˆ0([n])−
∑
i
δi = fˆ0([n])− δj −
∑
i 6=j
δi ≤ fˆ0([n] \ j)−
∑
i 6=j
δi = fˆ1([n] \ j)
Lemma 3.12 The outcome (x, p) of the clinching auction is such that x([n]) = f([n]).
Proof : We show the following invariant: if we define fˆ as in Fact 3.6, updating it each round as
ρ, d changes, we claim that the value of 1tρ+ fˆ([n]) remains constant.
To do so, we consider the events that can cause it to drop:
1. clinching: just after clinching occurs (i.e. ρi increases by δi, budgets decrease by pδi, demands
are adjusted, but before the price increases), the amount 1tρ+ fˆ([n]) remains the same since
ρt1 increases by δt1 and for all S, fˆ(S) decreases by δ(S), because to each i, ρ increases by
δi and di decreases by δi.
2. price pi increases and di decreases by θ, 0 ≤ θ ≤ di. If 1
tρ+ fˆ([n]) decreased then there was
some T, i /∈ T such that:
fˆ([n] \ i) + di − θ ≤ f(T )− ρ(T ) + d([n] \ T )− θ < fˆ([n])
Using Lemma 3.11, we know that fˆ([n]) ≤ fˆ([n] \ i), so di < θ which is not true.
The proofs of the previous two lemmas intuitively establishes the maximality of the clinching
procedure. Lemma 3.11 can be interpreted as saying that if we apply the clinching procedure
twice, without updating prices, then the second time will have no effect. The proof of Lemma 3.12
identifies an invariant that is maintained during the execution of the mechanism.
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Lemma 3.13 If ǫ < minvi 6=vj |vi − vj |, then property 2 of Lemma 3.8 is satisfied.
Proof : Suppose not and for the final outcome there are vj < vi, pi < Bi and all sets S such that
i ∈ S, j /∈ S are not tight. First, clearly xj 6= 0, otherwise [n] \ j would be tight by Lemma 3.12.
Then consider x˜ where x˜i = xi + θ, x˜j = xj − θ and x˜k = xk for all k 6= i, j. It is feasible for some
small θ.
Now, consider the promised allocation ρ and demands d just before the last time player j clinched
an amount δj > 0. If necessary decrease θ so that it becomes smaller than this last amount clinched,
i.e., θ < δj . At this point ρ ≤ x ≤ ρ+d. By the definition of clinching: P
j
ρ,d(δj) = P
j
ρ,d(θ) = P
j
ρ,d(0).
At this point, ρ ≤ x and ρj+θ < ρj+δj = xj. Therefore x˜ ≥ ρ. Also, we have that x−ρ ≤ d and
xi − ρi < di, since agent i hasn’t dropped his demand to zero yet and his demand never increases
and won’t be met while vi < pi. Here we are strongly using that ǫ < minvi 6=vj |vi − vj | to ensure that
for the last time player j clinches, player i demand is not zero yet. This implies that x˜− ρ ∈ Pρ,d
so (x˜ − ρ)−j ∈ P
j
ρ,d(0). Now, the fact that P
j
ρ,d(0) = P
j
ρ,d(δi) implies that xˆ = (xj, x˜−j) ∈ P . But
xˆ([n]) = x([n]) + θ = f([n]) + θ > f([n]), which is an absurd.
We can summarize the results as:
Theorem 3.14 For a polymatroidal environment, the auction in Algorithm 1 along with the clinch-
ing step described in Definition 3.2 has all the desirable properties.
Extensions and limitations of the clinching framework: The clinching framework de-
scribed in Algorithm 1 and Definition 3.2 is quite flexible: one can change the way clinching is
done or the way prices ascend and obtain an auction that is still truthful, individually rational, and
respects budgets. Pareto-optimality, however, is a delicate property to achieve. A natural question
is for which environments Pareto-optimality is still achievable? In appendix A, we show we can
extend this framework a little further (to scaled polymatroids), but not further than that.
Faster clinching: We showed in this section that for a generic polymatroid, we can calculate the
clinched amount using submodular minimization as a sub-routine. For each individual environment,
however, one can usually find much faster clinching subroutines. We illustrate this in appendix B
for the single-keyword AdWords polytope.
4 The AdWords Polytope and other applications
We begin by discussing some interesting applications of the auction presented in section 3. Then
we introduce a novel application of polymatroidal constraints to sponsored search auctions that
generalizes the classical models of Edelman et al [16] and Varian [31].
• Multi-unit auctions [14]: corresponds to the polymatroids associated with constant submod-
ular functions, i.e., f(S) = Q,∀S.
• Combinatorial auctions with matching constraints [18]: there is a bipartite graph ([m], [n], E)
between items [m] and bidders [n] and each buyer i has additive value 1 for each item j such
that (i, j) ∈ E and value 0 for each item not connected to him. We can represent this setting
by a polymatroid where f(S) is the number of items connected to some player in S. This is
called the transversal matroid.
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• Video on demand [8]: Consider company that provides video on demand that is located on a
node s of a direct network with capacities on the edges G = (V,E, c). Each buyer corresponds
to a node in the network. An allocation x is feasible if it is possible to transmit at rate xi for
each player i simultaneously. This is possible if for each subset S ⊆ [n] of players,
∑
i∈S xi is
smaller then the min-cut from s to S. Using the submodularity of the cut-function, it is easy
to see that the environment is a polymatroid.
• Spanning tree auctions: Consider the abstract setting where the agents are edges of a graph G
and the auctioneer is allowed to allocate goods to a set only if it has no cycles. This corresponds
to the graphical matroid of graph G. A more practical setting is when a telecommunication
company owns a network that contains cycles and decides to auction their redundant edges.
This setting corresponds to the dual-graphical matroid of G.
4.1 AdWords Polytope
Consider n advertisers and m keywords. Each advertiser i is interested in a subset of the keywords
Γ(i) ⊆ [m]. For a keyword k, we denote by Γ(k), the set of advertisers interested in this keyword.
With each keyword k, we associate |Γ(k)| positions. Position j for keyword k has click-through-rate
αkj (possibly zero) such that α
k
1 ≥ α
k
2 ≥ . . . ≥ α
k
|Γ(k)| for each k.
Assuming that each keyword gets a large amount of queries, we see αkj as the sum of number
of clicks that the j-th position of keyword k gets across all queries that it matches. For now, let’s
assume that the number of clicks a player gets in slot j of keyword k depends only on j, k and not
on the identity of the player. One is able to relax this assumption, as we see later.
Let Ak = {πk : Γ(k) →֒ [|Γ(k)|]} be the set of all allocations (one-to-one maps) from players to
slots for keyword k. Also, let ∆(Ak) be the distributions of such allocations. Given that, we can
define the AdWords polytope in the following way: an allocation of clicks x is feasible if there is a
distribution over allocations of players to slots for each keyword such that player i gets xi clicks in
expectation. More formally:
Definition 4.1 (AdWords Polytope) The AdWords polytope is the set of feasible allocations 6
of clicks x = (x1, . . . , xn) such that there are distributions Dk ∈ ∆(Ak) for each keyword, and
xi ≤
∑
k∈Γ(i)
Epik∼Dk [α
k
pik(i)
]
Our main result in this Section is that:
Theorem 4.2 The AdWords polytope is a polymatroid.
In order to prove the theorem, we first consider the setting with a single keyword and all
advertisers interested in it. Let the click-through-rates be α1 ≥ . . . ≥ αn. Feldman et al [17]
relate the problem of deciding if a vector x is feasible to a classical problem in machine scheduling,
i.e., scheduling in related machines with preemptions (Q|pmtn|Cmax [19]). What follows is a re-
statement of their characterization in a format that makes it clear it is a polymatroidal environment.
Lemma 4.3 (Feldman et al [17]) An allocation vector x is feasible iff for each S, x(S) ≤
∑|S|
j=1 αj ,
where x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi for each set S ⊆ [n].
6Since the number of clicks is typically very large we treat them as divisible goods and consider also fractional
allocations.
12
Notice that fk(S) =
∑|S|
j=1 α
k
j is a submodular function, so the set of feasible allocations for the
single-keyword setting is a polymatroid.
For the multiple-keyword setting, we say that an allocation vector x is feasible if we can write
xi =
∑
k∈Γ(i) x
k
i in such a way that the vector (x
k
i )i∈Γ(k) is feasible for keyword k, i.e., x
k(S) ≤ fk(S)
for every S ⊆ Γ(k).
The fact that this allocation set is a polymatroid is a direct consequence of the following theorem,
which is a polymatroidal version of Rado’s Theorem due to McDiarmid [24].
Theorem 4.4 (McDiarmid [24]) Given a bipartite graph ([n] ∪ [m], E), its neighborhood map
Γ(·), m submodular functions f1, . . . , fm and their respective polymatroids P1, . . . , Pm, then the set:
P ∗ = {x ∈ Rn+;xi =
∑
k∈Γ(i)
xki and x
k ∈ Pk}
is a polymatroid defined by the function
f∗(S) =
∑
k
fk(S ∩ Γ(k))
.
Quality factors: So far, we assumed that the click-through-rate of player i allocated to slot j
of keyword k depends solely on k and j. More generally, we would like to consider the click-through-
rate of a slot depending also on the player allocated in that slot. Let αkj,i be the click-through-rate of
position j of keyword j when player i is placed there. Traditionally, we consider the click-through-
rates in a product form, i.e., αkj,i = α
k
j · γ
k
i where γ
k
i is called quality factor. Assuming quality
factors are public information, one can, in a similar way, define a polytope of feasible allocations.
In general it will not be a polymatroid.
If the quality factors are uniform among all queries, i.e., γki = γi, the the set of feasible allocations
is given by P ∗γ = {x; (
xi
γi
)i ∈ P
∗} where P ∗ is the AdWords polytope defined as a function of αkj .
It is a scaled polymatroid, for which a variant of the auction in section 3 satisfies all desirable
properties (see appendix A).
5 Limitations of auctions for budget-constrained agents
Previously, we argued why simple modifications to the clinching auction would not work for poly-
hedral environments beyond (scaled) polymatroids. Here, we explore the possibility of designing an
auction of a different format achieving those properties and show that this is not possible even for
two players. We do so through a general characterization of Pareto-optimal auctions with desirable
properties. Before stating the characterization, we study the case with one budget-constrained
player and prove some lemmas that are useful in proving the general characterization result later.
5.1 One budget-constrained player
For ease of exposition, we first focus on 2 players and assume that the feasible set of allocations
P has a smooth and strictly-concave boundary, in the sense that for each v ∈ R2+ there is a single
point x∗(v) ∈ P maximizing vtx such that x∗(v) is a C∞-function. In fact, one can approximate any
polytope by such a set using the technique of Dolev et al [15]. Using compactness arguments, it is
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possible to get an auction for the original environment by taking the limit of the auctions obtained
for its C∞-approximations.
Assume that player 1 is not budget constrained and player 2 has budget B2 and let (x
∗, p∗) be
the VCG mechanism for this setting. Now, we can define the function:
ξ(v1) = min{v2; p
∗
2(v1, v2) ≥ B2}
Theorem 5.1 The allocation rule
x(v1, v2) = x
∗(v1,min{v2, ξ(v1)})
is monotone. Moreover, when coupled with the appropriate payment rule, it generates a Pareto-
optimal and budget feasible mechanism
Proof : The main part of the proof is to show that the allocation is monotone. If we show
that, it is clearly budget feasible for player 2, since we use the VCG-payment rule until the point
the budget of player 2 gets exhausted and from that point on, the allocation is constant. When
the budgets of the players are not exhausted, the allocation is efficient (since it mimics VCG) and
therefore is Pareto-optimal. The allocation when the budget of player 2 is exhausted is equivalent
to the VCG allocation of a pair (v1, v
′
2) with v
′
2 ≤ v2, so player 1 is getting x
∗
1(v1, v
′
2) ≥ x
∗
1(v1, v2)
by monotonicity of VCG. This implies Pareto-optimality as a consequence of Lemma 2.1.
Monotonicity: The allocation rule is clearly monotone for player 2. We need to show it is
monotone for player 1, i.e. that the function t 7→ x1(v1 + t, v2) is monotone non-decreasing. It
is clearly so for intervals where ξ(v1 + t) ≥ v2, so let’s assume that for t ∈ (−ǫ,+ǫ) we have
ξ(v1 + t) < v2. Our goal is to show that:
d
dtx
∗
1(v1 + t, ξ(v1 + t)) ≥ 0. Since the VCG-allocation
lies in the boundary of P , this is the same as showing that ddtx
∗
2(v1 + t, ξ(v1 + t)) ≤ 0. The crucial
observation is that the VCG-payment for player 2 on the curve (v1 + t, ξ(v1 + t)) is constant, i.e.:
B2 ≡ p
∗
2(v1 + t, ξ(v1 + t)) = ξ(v1 + t)x
∗
2(v1 + t, ξ(v1 + t))−
∫ ξ(v1+t)
0
x∗2(v1 + t, u)du
Now, we can simply derivate it with respect to t. We use the notation ∂if(·) for the derivative of
f with respect to the i-th variable. We also define x∗2(t) = x
∗
2(v1 + t, ξ(v1 + t)). Now,
0 = ξ′(v1 + t)x
∗
2(t) + ξ(v1 + t)
d
dt
x∗2(t)− ξ
′(v1 + t)x
∗
2(t)−
∫ ξ(v1+t)
0
∂1x
∗
2(v1 + t, u)du
ξ(v1 + t)
d
dt
x∗2(t) =
∫ ξ(v1+t)
0
∂1x
∗
2(v1 + t, u)du ≤ 0
since x∗2(v1, v2) decreases with v1 by the definition of the VCG allocation.
A variant of the proof can be used to show the following result for 2 budget constrained players.
This is useful for our general characterization.
Corollary 5.2 If the functions ξ1(v2), ξ2(v1) are such that the regions {v; v2 ≥ ξ2(v1)} and {v; v1 ≥
ξ1(v2)} are disjoint, then one can define
x(v1, v2) = x
∗(min{v1, ξ1(v2)},min{v2, ξ2(v1)})
pi(v) = vixi(v)−
∫ vi
0
xi(u, v−i)du.
If p2(v1, ξ2(v1)) ≡ B2 and p1(ξ1(v2), v2) ≡ B1, then (x, p) is a mechanism with the desirable prop-
erties.
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The above corollary has a strong fixed-point flavour and it is tempting to believe one could
get the existence of such a mechanism from this theorem. This is however not true, as shown in
the next section. However, this result remains useful as a tool for searching for such mechanisms
whenever they exist. For example, one can extend the above theorem to prove the existence of the
mechanisms for polyhedral environments when B1 is much larger then B2.
5.2 Characterization and impossibility
Now we discuss our main negative result: which states an impossibility of extending the auction
for polymatroids to general polyhedral environments.
Theorem 5.3 (Impossibility) There is no general auction for every polyhedral environment and
every pair of budgets that satisfies the desirable properties.
We prove it in two steps: first we prove a sequence of lemmas characterizing 2-player auctions
for polyhedral environments satisfying all the desirable properties. Then we fix a specific polyhedral
environment and argue that no mechanism can possibly satisfy this characterization.
First, we begin by understanding the format of an auction with the desirable properties where
the environment is a packing polytope P ⊆ R2+. We start by defining a family of VCG auctions.
VCG-family: We say that a mechanism is in the VCG-family if its allocation x(v) ∈ P is such
that
x(v) ∈ X∗(v) := argmaxx∈P v
tx.
Notice that there might be more than one such mechanism: if v is normal to an edge of the
polytope, then the entire edge is in the argmax. Nevertheless, x(v1+, v2) = limv′
1
↓v1 x(v
′
1, v2) and
x(v1, v2+) = limv′
2
↓v2 x(v1, v
′
2) are common for the entire family, as we see in the following lemma.
A consequence of this fact is that the payment function might not be unique, but p(v1+, v2) and
p(v1, v2+) are unique.
Lemma 5.4 Given a convex set P ⊆ R2+ and two allocation rules x(v), x˜(v) ∈ X
∗(v) := argmaxx∈P v
tx,
then x(v1+, v2) = x˜(v1+, v2), where x(v1+, v2) = limv′
1
↓v1 x(v
′
1, v2).
The proof is elementary and can be found in Appendix C. To illustrate this fact, consider the
simple case of P = {x ∈ R2+;x1 + x2 ≤ 1}. Then the VCG mechanism is well-defined for x1 6= x2,
which is, simply to allocate to the player with the highest value the entire amount. But notice
that completing this mechanism with any allocation in the points (v, v) generates a truthful mech-
anism. The payments of different mechanisms of the VCG family differ on (v, v), for example
pi(v, v) = vxi(v), but notice that the payments everywhere else are well-defined.
Pareto-optimal mechanisms: Now we turn our attention back to Pareto-optimal mechanisms
for two budget-constrained players. Let (x, p) be such mechanism. As a direct consequence of the
characterization of Pareto optimal outcomes (Lemma 2.1), we know the following:
• if pi(v) < Bi then xi(v) ≥ min{xi;x ∈ X
∗(v)}
• if p1(v) < B1, p2(v) < B2 then x(v) ∈ X
∗(v)
And a simple consequence of truthfulness:
• if pi(v) = Bi then for all v
′
i ≥ vi, x(v
′
i, v−i) = x(vi, v−i).
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Figure 2: Illustration of the proof of Lemma 5.5
Now, we are ready to start proving the characterization theorem. We will characterize the
mechanism in terms of the regions in the space of valuations where the budgets get exhausted. For
formally, we are interested in understanding the sets:
Ei = {v ∈ R
2
+; pi(v) = Bi}
Lemma 5.5 If mechanism (x, p) has the desirable properties, then either E1 ∩ E2 = ∅ or there
exists some a ∈ R2+ such that {v; v > a} ⊆ E1 ∩ E2 ⊆ {v; v ≥ a}.
Proof : Assume that E1 ∩ E2 is not empty. Then we will prove the lemma in two parts. For the
first part we will prove two statements: (i) if that if v0 ∈ E1∩E2 and v ≥ v
0 then x(v) = x(v0) and
(ii) if v, v′ ∈ E1 ∩E2 and v
∗
i = min{vi, v
′
i} then x(v
∗) = x(v) = x(v′). Then for the second part, we
show that this whole region that has constant allocation has budget exhausted for the two players.
See figure 2 for an illustration of the proof.
For (i), let v1 = (v1, v
0
2) and v
2 = (v01 , v2) and notice that x(v
0) = x(v1) = x(v2), since budgets
are exhausted so the allocation can’t increase. By monotonicity, x2(v) ≥ x2(v
1) = x2(v
0) and
x1(v) ≥ x1(v
2) = x1(v
0). Since all allocations lie in the boundary of the polytope, we must have
x(v) = x(v0).
The proof of (ii) is very similar, define v0i = max{vi, v
′
i}. Then by (i), x(v) = x(v
0) = x(v′) now,
by the exact same argument as above we show that x(v∗) = x(v0).
Now, if ai = inf{vi; v ∈ E1∩E2}, let us show that for v > a, v ∈ E1∩E2. Let us show that v ∈ E2
and then E1 is analogous. By definition, there is some v
′ ∈ E1∩E2 with v
′
1 < v1. Then (v
′
1, v2) ∈ E2
since the allocation is constant, for v > a, the budget of 2 is exhausted in (v′1, v2) iff it is exhausted in
(v′1, v
′
2). Now, note that by monotonicity x1(v
′
1, u) ≤ x1(v1, u) and since allocation is in the boundary
of the polytope x2(v
′
1, u) ≥ x2(v1, u). By the payment formula, p2(v) = v2x2(v) −
∫ v2
0 x2(v1, u)du
and by the fact that x2(v) = x2(v
′
1, v2), we have that B2 ≥ p2(v) ≥ p2(v
′
1, v2) = B2, so v ∈ E2.
The next lemma further describes the regions E1 and E2:
Lemma 5.6 If P is a packing polytope, there is a finite set of vectors {u1, u2, . . . , uk} such that
for v 6= tui for some t ≥ 0, the VCG family is uniquely defined. Moreover, if (x, p) is a mechanism
with the desirable properties and E1∩E2 ⊆ {v; v ≥ a} then if ξi(v−i) = inf{vi; pi(vi, v−i) = Bi} and
v−i < a−i, then (ξi(v−i), v−i) = tu
i for some t, i.
Proof : The set of vectors {u1, u2, . . . , uk} is simply the set of normals of the edges of the polytope
as depicted in the first part of Figure 3. If v is not an edge in the polytope, then the point in P
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Figure 3: Illustration of the proof of Lemma 5.6
maximizing vtx is a vertex and therefore uniquely defined. If we draw the lines ui · t for t > 0 we
divide the space of all possible valuations in regions (see second part of the figure): the regions
correspond to the vertices and the lines to edges of the polytope.
Now, given a certain mechanism (x, p), suppose that v1 < a1 the vector (v1, ξ2(v1)) is not
normal to any edge of P . Then clearly x∗(v1, ξ2(v1)) is well-defined and moreover, for some δ > 0
and v′2 ∈ [ξ2(v1) − δ, ξ2(v1) + δ], x
∗(v1, v
′
2) is well-defined and constant in the v
′
2-range. Also
(v1, v
′
2) /∈ E1 ∩ E2, since v1 < a1. For such v
′
2 > ξ2(v1), we know that (v1, v
′
2) ∈ E2, thus it is not
in E1 and therefore x2(v1, v
′
2) = x2(v1, ξ2(v1)) ≤ x
∗
2(v1, ξ2(v1)). For v
′
2 < ξ2(v1), (v1, v
′
2) /∈ E2 so
x2(v1, v
′
2) ≥ x
∗
2(v1, v
′
2). Using that x2(v1, v
′
2) is constant in v
′
2 in this range and taking v
′
2 ↑ ξ2(v1),
we get: x2(v1, v
′
2) ≥ x
∗
2(v1, ξ2(v1)).
Now, by monotonicity, we have x2(v1, v
′
2) = x
∗
2(v1, ξ2(v1)) for all v
′
2 in the interval (ξ2(v1) −
δ, ξ2(v1) + δ). Therefore the budget of player 2 could not have been exhausted on ξ2(v1).
The third part of Figure 3 illustrates how the region E2 typically looks like. If u
1, u2, . . . , uk
are sorted such that u1 corresponds to the edge that is higher to the left and uk corresponds to
the edge that is lower to the right, then we can divide [0, a1) in segments [0, r1), [r1, r2), . . . , [rk, a1)
such that for v1 ∈ [0, r1), ξ2(v1) =∞, and for v1 ∈ [ri, ri+1), (v1, ξ2(v1)) is in the line {t · u
i; t ≥ 0}.
To see why this is true, consider v1 < v
′
1 and assume that (v1, ξ2(v1)) is in the line {t · u
i; t ≥ 0}.
Then (v′1, ξ2(v
′
1)) cannot be strictly above this line, by a similar argument used in Lemma 5.5: look
at the allocation curves x2(v1, v2) ≥ x2(v
′
1, v2) and the payment formula – then player 2 must be
paying just above the {t · ui; t ≥ 0} for v′1 line at least as much as he was paying above this line for
v1 and hence his budgets must be exhausted.
5.3 Proof of the Impossibility Theorem
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 5.3, which states that there is no general auction with all
the desirable properties for all polyhedral environments P . We fix the following setting: a set of
feasible allocations
P = {x ∈ R2+; 2x1 + x2 ≤ 6, x1 + 2x2 ≤ 6}
and budgets B1 = B2 = 1. Assume that (x, p) is a mechanism with the desirable properties for
this setting. We will use the characterization lemmas in Section 5.2 to find a contradiction. We
illustrate the flow of the proof in Figure 4 (a brief summary of the proof is given in the caption of
the figure).
Fact 5.7 In the region [0, 23)× [0,
2
3), the mechanism (x, p) produces an efficient allocation (i.e., it
is equal to some mechanism of the VCG family).
17
P(2, 2)
(3, 0)
(0, 3)
v1
v2
2/3 4/3
2/3
4/3
v1
v2
Figure 4: Illustration of the proof of the impossibility theorem: in the first part we represent
the polytope P , in the second we represent the first main steps: we show that any auction must
resemble VCG in the red region (Fact 5.7) and extend the definition of the auction to the blue
region (Facts 5.8 and 5.9), showing that the budget of player 1 must get exhausted at the point
(1.23812 , 1.2381) and the budget of player 2 must get exhausted at the point (1.2381,
1.2381
2 ). We use
this fact to show that the allocation must be constant in the green region (Fact 5.10), contradicting
Pareto-optimality for allocation of the form (v1, v2) where
1.2381
2 < v1 <
2
3 as v2 →∞.
Proof : First notice that no mechanism in the VCG-family for P exhausts the budget in [0, 23 )×
[0, 23). Now, we turn our attention to the mechanism (x, p), which is a mechanism with the desirable
properties for this setting.
In [0, 13) × [0,
2
3), player 1 cannot exhaust his budget, since x1 ≤ 3 and v1 <
1
3 . We claim that
in this area the mechanism needs to behave like VCG. If there is a point in this region where x(v)
doesn’t maximize vtx for x ∈ P , then the budget of player 2 must be exhausted. So, there is some
(v1, v2) such that for v
′
2 > v2, p2(v1, v
′
2) = B2 and for v
′
2 < v2, x(v1, v
′
2) is in the VCG family.
Now, notice that the allocation for v′2 > v2 must be x2(v
′
2, v1) ≤ x
∗
2(v
′
2, v1). This contradicts the
fact that the budget is exhausted for v′2 ↓ v2. So, this shows that (x, p) must allocate efficiently
on [0, 13) × [0,
2
3). Now, for [0,
2
3) × [0,
1
3 ), we can do the same argument. Now, what remains are
the points in [13 ,
2
3) × [
1
3 ,
2
3). Let v be such a point. Notice that for (
1
3 − ǫ, v2) and (v1,
1
3 − ǫ), the
allocation must be (2, 2) because of the previous argument. By monotonicity, x(v) = (2, 2) which
is the efficient allocation.
Now, we know how any mechanism (x, p) with the desirable properties should look like in the
red region of Figure 4. Next, we try to understand how it should look in the blue region. In order
to do so, we need some definitions. From Lemma 5.5 we know that there is a ∈ R2+ ∪ {(∞,∞)})
such that: {v; v > a} ⊆ E1 ∩E2 ⊆ {v; v ≥ a}. We also define:
v˜2 = min{v2; p1(
v2
2
+, v2) = 1}
v˜1 = min{v1; p2(v1,
v1
2
+) = 1}
And we focus on the region R, which we define as the interior of the rectangle between (0, 0) and
(v˜2/2, v˜2).
Fact 5.8 The budget of player 1 does not get exhausted in R. Also, 23 < v˜2 ≤ 1.2381
Proof : First, assume v˜2 < 4/3. Then by Fact 5.7, the budget of player 1 does not get exhausted
in [0, 23 )× [0,
2
3 ) and by the definition of v˜2 and lemma 5.6 it cannot be exhausted for [0,
v˜2
2 )×(
1
3 , v˜2).
Notice that a cannot be in this region, because it would also contradict the definition of v˜2.
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Given this fact, let us analyze how the mechanism should be in this setting. We do so, by fixing
v1 and looking at x2(v1, v2). We can use the same argument as in the previous fact to argue that
x(v1, v2) must be the efficient allocation for v2 < 2v1 in R and also for all v1 ≤
1
3 . For v1 >
1
3 and
v2 > 2v1, if we allocate as in VCG, we exceed the budget. So, the allocation for those points must
exactly match the budget of player 2. So, the only possible value must be such that:
2 ·
1
2
v1 + (x2(v)− 2)2v1 = 1
and therefore the allocation must be
x(v) =
(
3−
1
v1
, 2 +
1− v1
2v1
)
.
Now, this determines the payment of player 1 in the rectangle. We know that for δ ↓ 0,
p1(
v˜2
2 − δ, v˜2 − 3δ) < 1, which we can write as:
lim
δ↓0
p1(
v˜2
2
− δ, v˜2 − 3δ) = 2 ·
v˜2
2
−
∫ v˜2/2
1/3
3−
1
z
dz = 1−
v˜2
2
+ log
(
3
2
v˜2
)
≤ 1
This implies that v˜2 ≤ 1.2381. Notice that this excludes the fact that v˜2 > 4/3, otherwise we could
have done the same analysis on [0, 23 ]× [0, v˜2] and arrived in the same conclusion that v˜2 ≤ 1.2381.
Fact 5.9 v˜2 = 1.2381 and x(
v˜2
2 +, v˜2) = (2, 2).
Proof : Since 23 < v˜2 ≤ 1.2381, we know that x2(
v˜2
2 +, v˜2) ≥ 2 by using that x2(
v˜2
2 +,
1
3) = 2 (Fact
5.7) and monotonicity. Therefore, x1(
v˜2
2 +, v˜2) ≤ 2. Writing the payment for player 1 at this point
we get:
1 = p1(
v˜2
2
+, v˜2) = x1(
v˜2
2
+, v˜2) ·
v˜2
2
−
∫ v˜2/2
1/3
3−
1
z
dz ≤ 1−
v˜2
2
+ log
(
3
2
v˜2
)
which implies that v˜2 = 1.2381 and x(
v˜2
2 +, v˜2) = (2, 2), since all inequalities must be tight.
Fact 5.10 v˜1 = v˜2 = 1.2381 and x(v) = (2, 2) for all valuation profiles v > (
v˜1
2 ,
v˜2
2 ).
Proof : We can apply the same argument exchanging 1 and 2 and conclude that v˜1 = v˜2.
Now, to see that for v′1, v
′
2 >
v˜i
2 we have x(v
′
1, v˜2) = x(v˜1, v
′
2) = (2, 2), we analyze four regions. If
v ∈ (v˜i/2, v˜i]× (v˜i/2, v˜i] or v ∈ [v˜i,∞)× [v˜i,∞) we can use the standard monotonicity argument to
show that x(v) = (2, 2).
For the regions [v˜1,∞)× (
v˜1
2 , v˜1) and (
v˜2
2 , v˜2)× [v˜2,∞) is a little trickier. We do the analysis for
the first one. The second is analogous.
Clearly p2(v˜1, v˜2) = 1. Now, for v
′
1 > v˜1, x(v
′
1, v˜2) = x(v˜1, v˜2) = (2, 2). And for all v2 we
have x1(v
′
1, v2) ≥ x1(v˜1, v2) and therefore x2(v
′
1, v2) ≤ x2(v˜i, v2). Now, since p2(v1, v2) = v2x2(v)−∫ v2
0 x2(v1, u)du clearly p2(v
′
1, v˜2) ≥ p2(v˜1, v˜2) = 1. Therefore p2(v
′
1, v˜2) = 1, since the mechanism
respects budgets. Notice that the only way it can be true is that if x2(v
′
1, v2) = x2(v˜i, v2), so we
must have x2(v
′
1, v2) = (2, 2) for v
′
1 ∈ [v˜i,∞).
We can use the exact same argument for region: ( v˜i2 , v˜i)× [v˜i,∞).
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Now we are ready to prove Theorem 5.3:
Proof of Theorem 5.3 : Now, by putting Fact 5.10 and Fact 5.7 together, we get a contradiction
with the Pareto-optimality: consider v˜i2 < v1 <
2
3 then by facts 5.10 and 5.7 combined, we know
that x2(v1, v2) = 0 for v2 <
v1
2 and x2(v1, v2) = 2 for v2 >
v1
2 , so the budget of player 2 never gets
exhausted even for v2 →∞. This contradicts Pareto-optimality for v2 > 2v1, since if his budget is
not exhausted, he should get allocated at least as much as he gets in VCG.
5.4 Multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginals
As a by-product of Theorem 5.3, we can answer in a negative way the question of the existence of
truthful Pareto-optimal auctions for multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginals. Consider the
following setting:
Setting: Consider a supply of s of a certain divisible good and two players in such a way that the
feasible allocations are (x1, x2) such that x1+x2 ≤ s. Player i has a public budget Bi and a private
valuation which is a increasing concave function Vi : [0, s]→ R+. Upon getting xi units of the good
and paying pi, player i has utility ui = Vi(xi)− pi.
It is tempting to believe that one could adapt the clinching framework in Algorithm 1 to deal
with this setting, by simply redefining the demand function as something like:
di = min
{
Bi
p
,max{xi; ∂Vi(ρi + xi) ≤ p}
}
where ∂Vi(xi) is the marginal valuation at xi. Indeed, if Vi(xi) = vi · xi, this recovers the original
way of calculating demands. In appendix D we give a counter-example showing that the clinching
framework with this new demand function results in a non-truthful mechanism. The intuition
behind the counter example is that some player can increase his declared value on items he won’t
get anyway in order to increase the payment of his opponent, exhausting his budget earlier. This
way, he is able to get items for cheaper in the end.
In the following theorem, we show that no auction mechanism can satisfy all the desirable
properties for this setting:
Theorem 5.11 There is no truthful, Pareto-optimal and budget-feasible auction for this setting.
Proof : Suppose that (xˆ(V1, V2), pˆ(V1, V2)) is a mechanism satisfying all the desirable properties
for multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginals. Then we can use it as a black-box to construct
a mechanism for a general polyhedral environment, contradicting Theorem 5.3. Given a certain
polyhedral environment, we can describe
P = {x ∈ [0, α] × [0, β];x2 ≤ h(x1)}
where h : [0, α] → [0, β] is a monotone non-increasing concave function, h(0) = β and h(α) = 0.
Now, using (xˆ, pˆ) for s = 1, build the following mechanism: if players report valuations v1, v2 build
the following concave functions: V1(x1) = v1 · αx1 and V2(x2) = v2 · h(α − αx2).
Now, simply define
x(v1, v2) = (αxˆ1, h(αxˆ1))
p(v1, v2) = pˆ(V1, V2).
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The mechanism is clearly truthful, individually rational and budget-feasible. It is also easy to see
that sets of allocation can me mapped 1-1 between those two settings, preserving Pareto-optimality.
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A Extensions and Limitations of the clinching framework
Scaled polymatroids: If P ⊆ Rn+ is a polymatroid, γ ∈ R
n
+, then we call Pγ = {x; (
xi
γi
)i ∈ P} a
scaled polymatroid. If the environment is Pγ , it is easy to see that a truthful, individually-rational,
Pareto-optimal and budget-feasible auction is obtained by running the polymatroid clinching auc-
tion on P with inputs γivi instead of vi. It is simple to see that this is equivalent to a standard
clinching auction with input values vi but price clocks advancing on a different speed for each player.
Scaled polymatroids are important since they correspond to the setting of AdWords with Quality
Factors discussed at the end of section 4.1).
Beyond scaled polymatroids: one could change the way clinching is done and one could
change the price trajectories, maybe in a more sophisticated way then the one we did for the scaled
polymatroids. If the trajectory is such that it only depends on P and budgets (not on values)
and pi never decreases, the auction retains truthfulness and budget feasibility. Here we argue that
none of such changes would generate a Pareto-optimal auction when P is not a scaled polymatroid.
Assume n = 2 for simplicity and imagine that there is trajectory for the price vector p and a
clinching procedure. Also assumes valuations are much smaller than budgets in such a way that
the mechanism cannott exhaust budgets and therefore the auction must allocate like VCG. Any
such mechanism must decide on the whole allocation the first time pi = vi for some component,
having only the information that vj ≥ pj for the other component, since at this point he needs to
allocate to the second player. So, the environment must be such that there is a price trajectory
p(t), where the optimal allocation is constant for all points (p1, v2) for all v2 > p2. And also, it
should be constant for all (v1, p2) for all v1 > p1. Notice that scaled polymatroids are exactly those
environments.
B Faster clinching sub-routines
In Lemma 3.5 we showed that for any generic polymatroidal environment P we can perform the
clinching step in polynomial time if we have oracle access to the submodular function defining the
polymatroid. In order to do so, we solve a submodular minimization problem. For most practical
applications, however, one can design much simpler and faster algorithms for clinching. Clinching
involves solving the following problem: given an environment P , ρ ∈ P and d ∈ Rn+ we want to
compute:
max{1tx;x+ ρ ∈ P, 0 ≤ x ≤ d} (3)
We illustrate how to solve this problem efficiently for the single-keyword AdWords polytope:
given α1 ≥ α2 ≥ . . . ≥ αn, consider the environment:
P = {x ∈ Rn+;x(S) ≤
∑|S|
j=1 αj ,∀S ⊆ [n]}
Lemma B.1 For the single-keyword AdWords polytope, the optimization problem defined in equa-
tion (3) can be solved using the following greedy algorithm: we can assume wlog that the components
are sorted such that ρ1 + d1 ≥ ρ2 + d2 ≥ . . . ≥ ρn + dn. Now, define inductively
zi = min{ρi + di,
∑i
j=1 αj −
∑i−1
j=1 zj}.
Then
∑
i zi − ρi is the solution to the problem.
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Proof : If we drop the restriction that x ≥ 0 in (3), then it is easy to see that x = z − ρ is an
optimal solution to this problem using, for example, a local exchange argument. Now, we show
that we can fix this problem, by modifying z such that z ≥ ρ.
In order to fix that, consider the smaller i such that zi < ρi. By the definition of zi, it must
be the case that zi =
∑i
j=1 αj −
∑i−1
j=1 zj, so
∑i
j=1 zj =
∑i
j=1 αj . Then there must be some k < i
such that zk > ρk, otherwise we would have
∑i
j=1 ρj >
∑i
j=1 αj contradicting the fact that ρ ∈ P .
Notice we can increase zi by some small δ and decrease zk by a small δ. And obtain another vector
z which is also such that z ∈ P, z ≤ ρ + d and has the same 1tz value (the fact that z ∈ P after
this transformation is due to the nature of the constraints). We can repeat this process until we
get z ≥ ρ.
C Missing proofs in Section 5
Proof of Lemma 5.4 : Suppose that x(v1+, v2) 6= x˜(v1+, v2), then say that x1(v1+, v2) >
x˜1(v1+, v2). Since both are in the boundary of the polytope, it means that for all (v
′
1, v2) with
v′1 > v1, x˜1(v
′
1, v2) ≥ x1(v1+, v2), since the points to the right of x(v1+, v2) are clearly better then
the ones to the left of it. So x˜1(v
′
1, v2) can’t converge to x˜1(v1+, v2) < x1(v1, x2).
D Counter-example to clinching with decreasing marginals
Consider the setting of multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginals described in section 5.4, and
the variant of the clinching auction in Algorithm 1 where demands are calculated by:
di = min
{
Bi
p
,max{xi; ∂Vi(ρi + xi) ≤ p}
}
Our main claim here is that this auction is not truthful. We show that by providing an example:
consider an initial supply of s = 2 budgets B1 =∞, B2 = 4 and valuations:
V1(x) =
{
4x, x ∈ [0, 1]
4 + x, x ∈ [1, 2]
V2(x) = 3x, x ∈ [0, 2]
The outcome of that is x1 = 1, x2 = 1 and p1 = 3, p2 = 1 since budgets never get exhausted.
Now, we show that player 1 has a profitable deviation. He could report the following valuation
instead:
V˜1(x) =
{
4x, x ∈ [0, 1]
4 + 2x, x ∈ [1, 2]
The the price clock increases up to 2 without any clinching. For 2+, the demand of player 1 drops
and player 2 is able to clinch one unit by the price of 2, remaining with budget 2. Now, as price
goes up, player 2’s demand keeps decreasing, since his leftover budget is only 2 and the price is
greater than 2. As a result, player 1 will be able to start clinching at price p = 2+ and therefore
will have x˜1 = 1, p˜1 < 3, which is a strict improvement over the truth-telling strategy.
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